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DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM EXPERIMENTS: A
PANEL QUANTILE REGRESSION EXAMINATION∗
CARLOS LAMARCHE and ROBERT PAUL HARTLEY†
Abstract: In an influential article, Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes (American Economic Review, 2006; 96, 988-1012) illustrate the importance of estimating heterogeneous impacts of
welfare reform experiments. They find that the mean treatment effect offers an uninformative summary of opposing effects, while the treatment effects are significantly different
across quantiles. We replicate their results and evaluate the robustness of their findings to
accounting for individual-specific heterogeneity possibly associated with welfare program
participation. We find results that are in general similar to Bitler’s et al. findings, although
the interpretation of labor supply effects in the upper tail is revised. We find no evidence
of behavioral induced participation.
Keywords: Welfare Reform; Quantile Regression; Panel data; Program participation.
JEL Codes: J2, I38, H53, C21, C33.

Distributional effects of policies are increasingly the causal effect of interest among social
scientists. In a manuscript published in the September 2006 issue of American Economic
Review, Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes (2006) illustrate the importance of estimating quantile treatment effects (QTEs) to analyze a welfare reform experiment. Beginning in 1996,
Connecticut implemented a welfare waiver program called Jobs First, under which women
experienced more generous earnings disregards compared to Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC). Welfare recipients and applicants were randomized into either Jobs First
or AFDC. Bitler et al. find heterogeneous responses in earnings and total income that can be
explained using conventional labor supply theory. The reform had no impact at the lower tail
of the conditional distribution of earnings, it increased the conditional median of earnings,
and it reduced the upper tail of the earnings distribution. While the mean treatment effect
provides an uninformative summary of opposing effects, treatment effects exhibit significant
differences across quantiles.
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The identification of the quantile treatment effect relied on random assignment data from
Connecticut’s Jobs First waiver program. As Bitler et al. pointed out, there might be potential issues of selection, which are addressed by using propensity score weighting. Although
in principle randomization provides the basis for anticipating that unobservables tend to be
similarly balanced across treatment and control, low-income women’s preferences over work
and welfare may change due to features of either Jobs First or AFDC. It might be possible
that interactions of program features and individual characteristics shape preferences differentially as well as heterogeneously with respect to the distribution of earnings. For instance,
it is known that behavioral labor supply responses depend on individual costs associated
with welfare participation (see, e.g., Moffitt, 1983, Blank, Card and Robins, 2000). An individual who is initially ineligible for welfare will reduce hours and consequently earnings
if the additional utility from extra leisure is greater than the utility loss from lower earnings and the “stigma” that come with participation. Thus, preferences for working among
women assigned to Jobs First might be different than even their own preferences had they
been assigned to AFDC and were not on welfare years later. Therefore, when practitioners
use repeated measurements of outcome variables in welfare reform experiments, it seems
appropriate to model preference heterogeneity possibly associated with program features.
Rather than this being a new result, we argue that it is another version of Burtless and
Hausman’s (1978) argument that two observationally equivalent individuals facing identical
budget constraints can respond in very different ways to changes in the constraint. See also
Moffitt (1990, 2002) for further discussion on the importance of individual parameters in the
stochastic specification of econometric models. For theory and application of distributional
analysis for welfare treatment effects, see Blundell, MaCurdy and Meghir (2007), Bollinger,
Gonzalez and Ziliak (2009), and Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997), among others.
This paper investigates the robustness of the empirical results in Bitler et al. to addressing latent individual heterogeneity. We first replicate their original results, and then we
show that these results can be obtained using standard quantile regression techniques. A
parametric quantile regression estimator produces roughly the same point estimates as a
non-parametric estimator. This result is interpreted as evidence suggesting that the treatment has a linear effect. In addition, we repeat the analysis without using inverse-propensity
score weighting and we find that the Bitler et al. conclusions are qualitatively robust to the
unweighted estimation. In this paper, however, we find that accounting for unobservable
heterogeneity, possibly associated with individual costs of welfare participation, matters for
understanding responses of low-income women at the upper tail of the conditional distribution of the response variable. While the results are generally similar to Bitler’s et al. results,
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the interpretation of a low-income woman’s labor supply in the upper tail is revised. We
find no evidence of reduced earnings from behavioral induced participation.
1. Empirical Approach
Consider the standard potential outcome approach to causal inference. A response variable
or potential outcome has two values for a low-income woman i at quarter t, (Y0,it , Y1,it ), one
of which is observed and is labeled Yit . The observed outcome depends upon the random
treatment assignment, Dit , which can take {0, 1} values indicating AFDC or Jobs First
status, respectively. We then write Yit = Dit Y1,it + (1 − Dit )Y0,it . Lastly, let QY (τ ) denote
the τ -th quantile of the distribution of Y .
Bitler et al. motivate their empirical results using predictions from a static labor supply
model and find evidence that the QTE, ∆(τ ) = QY1 (τ ) − QY0 (τ ), is not constant across
quantiles τ . As shown in Section 3.2, their findings can be obtained by estimating the
QTE using the following linear equation: Yit = Y0,it + ∆Dit . Consider now that the treatment is subject-specific satisfying ∆i + Y0,it = Y1,it . This can be motivated by changes in
preferences given the specific features of the policy reform, fundamentally reflecting that a
low-income woman can respond in different ways to welfare participation. Under the simplifying assumption that ∆i = vi +∆, it follows that the treatment effect can be estimated using
Yit = Y0,it +vi Dit +∆Dit or, if the treatment indicator is time invariant, Yit = Y0,it +αi +∆Di
where αi = vi Di . Note that this leads to a sparse model where αi is equal to zero if Di = 0
and αi = vi if Di = 1.
At the upper quantiles of earnings, the model has a natural interpretation. Consider an
earnings level that exceeds the sum of the poverty line and the maximum benefit (i.e., point
H, Figure 1, Bitler et al. 2006). The location assigned to AFDC is above the poverty line,
and consequently, there are no costs of welfare participation (e.g., αi = 0). On the other
hand, woman i can choose to reduce hours of work without a reduction in total income.
The reduction in earnings can be compensated with transfers. In this case, there is also an
individual cost of welfare participation, here labeled αi = vi . Therefore, there is a range of
earnings toward the upper quantiles where behavioral induced eligibility effects might not be
observed if the program evaluator accounts for welfare participation costs, including stigma.
The QTE, ∆(τ ), can be estimated by using panel data quantile regression methods (see,
ˆ λ) is obtained from a model that
e.g., Koenker, 2004; Lamarche, 2010). The estimator ∆(τ,
controls for latent individual heterogeneity and is a function of a tuning parameter λ. Under
independence between vi and Di , which holds here by randomization, this estimator produces
more precise estimates while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. It can also ameliorate
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potential issues associated with incidental parameters in more general models than the one
estimated in this paper. In addition, the advantage of the method in this setting is that it
can estimate sparse models and control for a low-income woman’s latent heterogeneity while
identifying the effect of the time-invariant treatment indicator, Di .
2. Data and Welfare Reform
The data used in this comment were obtained from the AER website and MDRC (formerly Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation). The experimental evaluation of
Connecticut’s Jobs First waiver by MDRC was used by Bitler et al. (2006). Table A.1 in
the Appendix reproduces Table 3 in Bitler et al. (2006) offering sample means for several
demographic characteristics, earnings, cash welfare and food stamps among women in the
experimental data. Although we use data from a randomized welfare experiment, the means
of a few variables are statistically significantly different by treatment status. This leads
to Bitler’s et al. approach of employing inverse-propensity score weighting to control for
selection on observables, though this does not influence results qualitatively.
Connecticut implemented Jobs First as a welfare reform waiver program beginning in
1996. Approximately half of the cash welfare participants were assigned to Jobs First and
the other half to AFDC. The Connecticut Department of Social Services along with MDRC
collected data for 7 to 8 months before random assignment and at least 16 months after.
The data available represent a panel of earnings, transfers, and total income for 4803 women.
Transfers is the sum of cash welfare and food stamps, and total income is the sum of earnings
and transfers.
The key feature of this waiver program is a 100-percent earnings disregard (up to the
federal poverty line), which leads to an implicit tax of zero percent. In contrast, AFDC
disregarded the first $120 of monthly earnings for the first year in the program and $90 after
the first year. Other key differences are time limits and sanctions. While Jobs First has a
strict 21-month time limit, AFDC has no time limits. See Table 1 in Bitler et al. (2006) as
well as Bloom et al. (2002) for a detailed description of differences between Jobs First and
AFDC programs.
3. Empirical results
3.1. Replication and weighted quantile treatment effects. Bitler et al. (2006) estimate the QTE by measuring the difference between the empirical cumulative distributions
of the treatment and control groups for each variable of interest: earnings, transfers, and
total income. Their QTE is simply the difference between the τ th quantile of the response
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BGH
Quantile τ

(1)

QR
(2)

PQR

(3)
(4)
(5)
Earnings, Quarters 1-7
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.50
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00 200.00
(30.05) (28.24) (35.07) (23.34) (49.56)
0.75
300.00
300.00
300.00
100.00 576.23
(90.28) (123.98) (100.90) (101.18) (77.15)
0.90
-200.00 -200.00 -200.00 -300.00 442.02
(115.30) (212.31) (124.50) (123.77) (87.75)
Total Income, Quarters 8-16
0.10
0.00
0.00
-0.00
0.00
-286.40
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00) (75.28)
0.25
-150.00 -150.00 -150.00 -150.00 -25.94
(107.20) (113.74) (117.05) (113.08) (42.24)
0.50
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
170.36
(66.38) (71.74) (68.39) (68.12) (55.18)
0.75
300.00
250.00
300.00
200.00 295.28
(89.31) (122.13) (96.09) (97.47) (58.41)
0.90
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
449.61
(111.27) (210.86) (120.58) (115.05) (75.89)
IPS weights
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Individual effects
No
No
No
No
Yes

(6)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
100.00
(48.24)
500.00
(97.75)
200.00
(83.95)
-400.00
(72.02)
-150.00
(48.36)
50.00
(55.64)
250.00
(67.23)
328.00
(64.34)
No
Yes

Table 3.1.
Quantile Treatment Effects on the Distribution of Earnings (Quarters 1-7) and Total Income (Quarters 8-16). BGH denotes nonparametric quantile estimates as in Bitler et al. (2006), QR denotes quantile
regression and PQR denotes panel quantile regression. Bootstrap standard errors are shown in parentheses based on 1000 replications. IPS denotes inversepropensity score weighting.

variable for women in the Jobs First program and the τ th quantile of the response variable
for women in the AFDC program. In what follows, we refer to QTE as a general parameter
of interest and label their approach BGH. We restrict our attention to earnings in the first
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7 quarters after the reform is introduced in order to focus on behavioral responses in the
upper tail of the earnings distribution before the Jobs First time limit becomes binding. If
behavioral induced participation is expected, it would be most clearly evident before time
limits apply to women assigned to Jobs First.
Table 3.1 presents results for the QTE estimated as in Bitler et al. (2006). These results
are compared to estimates obtained from quantile regression (QR) and panel quantile regression for a model with individual effects (PQR). It is worth noting that we reproduce all
of the BGH estimates exactly with only very slight variations in the confidence intervals for
these estimates based on different random samples used for the 1000 bootstrap replications.1
Following Bitler et al., we use inverse-propensity score weighting to obtain the QTE estimates shown in column (1); estimates obtained without weights are shown in column (2).
Given the random design of Jobs First, which remains a model program for welfare reform
evaluation, one might expect the unweighted and weighted QTE results to be similar. As
the authors mention, and we confirm in our replication, there is no qualitative difference and
only small quantitative differences in the point estimates presented in columns (1) and (2).
For the results shown, the only difference from weighting the BGH estimates is at the
0.75 quantile for total income in quarters 8-16: 300 in column (1) and 250 in column (2).
The data are measured in discrete units with dollars rounded to the nearest hundred, so
a quantile estimate difference of 50 may represent a small difference. Comparing weighted
and unweighted QTEs for several quantiles between 0.05 and 0.95 (in results not shown here
but available upon request), we find that there is no qualitative difference by weighting, and
little quantitative difference.
3.2. Quantile regression. Under the assumption that the treatment effect is linear and
treatment status is randomly assigned, the estimator for the QTE used in Bitler et al. and
the quantile regression estimator for a model that conditions on the treatment indicator
variable are expected to yield similar results (see, e.g., Koenker, 2005). The weighted and
unweighted QR results are shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.1. The results for QR
are similar to those of BGH.
Table 3.1 shows some differences between BGH and the QR estimates in column (4),
although a closer examination of the estimated effects across 91 equally spaced quantiles
1Of

the 4803 women in the sample, 30 are missing data for quarter 16. Bitler et al. note that estimation
for quarters 8-16 uses 4773 × 9 = 42957 individual-quarter observations; however, their code obtained from
the AER website and figures are consistent with the use of 4773 × 9 + 30 × 8 = 43197 observations. We
include all 4803 women and reproduce their estimates for total income in quarters 8-16.
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Figure 3.1. Quantile Treatment Effects on the Distribution of Earnings,
Quarters 1-7. BGH shows estimates obtained as in Bitler et al. and QR denotes quantile regression estimates obtained without inverse-propensity score
weighting. The dashed lines represent 90-percent confidence intervals obtained
by 1000 bootstrap replications.
reveals that the estimated QTE estimates obtained using QR are similar to the BGH estimates. Figure 3.1 provides a graphical comparison of BGH and the unweighted QR where
the similarity of estimates may be more apparent. Therefore, the BGH results appear to be
robust to the use of weights and an alternative parametric specification for estimating the
QTE. It is important to emphasize that this additional empirical evidence continues to indicate that there is substantial heterogeneity predicted by labor supply theory and low-income
women can increase income by reducing hours and claiming welfare, which is consistent with
the behavioral induced participation hypothesis.
3.3. Panel quantile regression. As discussed in the previous sections, it is of fundamental
importance to allow for individual parameters in the stochastic specification of QTEs. In
the last columns of Table 3.1, we present the weighted (column 5) and unweighted (column
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Figure 3.2. Quantile Treatment Effects on the Distribution of Earnings,
Quarters 1-7. BGH shows estimates obtained as in Bitler et al. and PQR
denotes panel quantile regression estimates. The dashed lines represent 90percent confidence intervals obtained by 1000 bootstrap replications.

6) panel quantile regression results. The PQR results were obtained by estimating λ as
suggested in the literature (Koenker 2005, Lamarche 2010). We estimate λ to be approximately 0.718 for earnings and 0.673 for total income. In spite of controlling for individual
heterogeneity, the PQR estimator delivers results that are similar to those offered by BGH
and QR at the center of the distribution. In contrast, we observe significant differences at
the upper quantiles of the conditional distribution of earnings.
One of the interesting results in Bitler et al. is the reduction of earnings for women in
the upper tail of the distribution. This response was predicted as a natural consequence of
a behavioral induced participation attributed to a reduction of exits from welfare. However,
when we control for latent individual heterogeneity, the negative treatment effect disappears.
Looking at the 0.90 quantile of earnings, for example, there is an unweighted BGH estimate
of -200 compared with a PQR estimate of 200. As opposed to seeing a negative effect in
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(a) Earnings, Quarters 1−7

(b) Total Income, Quarters 8−16

0
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PQR
QR
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Quantile Treatment Effect
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^
λ = 0.718
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Figure 3.3. Quantile Treatment Effects at the 90th Quantile of the Distribution of (a) Earnings, Quarters 1-7, and (b) Total Income, Quarters 8-16.
PQR shows panel quantile regression estimates and QR denotes quantile regression estimates. The dashed lines represent 90-percent confidence intervals
obtained by 1000 bootstrap replications.
the upper tail of the earnings distribution, the estimated treatment effect continues to be
positive and statistically significantly different than zero (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.3 shows QTE results for the 0.90 quantile as a function of λ in order to emphasize
the differences when accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in the upper tail of the earnings
and total income distributions. These panels demonstrate the importance of the choice of
λ to the robustness of PQR results. A value of λ near zero gives results similar to the
QTE obtained from a panel quantile model with fixed effects, whereas a parameter value
approaching infinity produces QTE results that are equivalent to QR. Each panel shows PQR
results at the 0.90 quantile for 80 equally spaced λ’s defined over the interval (0, 8]. We find
that a value of λ less than 2 is consistent with the limiting case of fixed effects quantile
regression results since the QTE estimated by PQR is roughly constant around 200 to 300
dollars. Panel (a) also shows that the QTE point estimates obtained by PQR converge to
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the QR results as λ gets near 8, although the PQR point estimates are more precise. Panel
(b) shows that there are significant differences at the upper tail of total income, and the
effect is not negligible when we account for latent heterogeneity.
4. Conclusion
It is typically expected that randomization would provide the basis for anticipating that
observables and unobservables are equally balanced by treatment status. This naturally
applies to the analysis of welfare reform experiments. Motivated by the work of Moffitt (1983)
and Blank, Card and Robins (2000), this paper points out the importance of addressing
unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of QTE using experimental data. We revisited
one of the most influential empirical studies of distributional effects of welfare reforms,
Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes (2006), and find that their conclusions are qualitatively robust to
selection bias and they are generally similar to results obtained by other quantile techniques.
In models with individual effects, however, we find no evidence of reduced earnings from
behavioral induced participation.
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Appendix A. Experimental data
Levels

Differences

Variables
Jobs First AFDC Unadjusted Adjusted
White
0.362
0.348
0.014
0.001
Black
0.368
0.371
-0.003
-0.000
Hispanic
0.207
0.216
-0.009
-0.001
Never married
0.654
0.661
-0.007
-0.000
Div/wid/sep/living apart
0.332
0.327
0.005
0.000
HS dropout
0.350
0.334
0.017
-0.000
HS diploma/GED
0.583
0.604
-0.021
0.001
More than HS diploma
0.066
0.062
0.004
0.000
∗
More than two children
0.235
0.214
0.021
-0.000
Mother younger than 25
0.289
0.297
-0.007
-0.000
Mother age 25-34
0.410
0.418
-0.007
0.000
Mother older than 34
0.301
0.286
0.015
0.000
∗
Recipient (stock) sample
0.624
0.593
0.031
-0.001
Earnings
678.908 785.895 -106.988∗
-0.887
∗
Cash welfare
890.818 835.112
55.706
-0.833
Food stamps
352.117 339.352
12.764
0.316
Any earnings
0.322
0.351
-0.029∗
0.000
∗
Any cash welfare
0.573
0.544
0.029
-0.001
Any food stamps
0.607
0.598
0.009
0.000
Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status. The table reports
sample averages and ∗ denotes statistically significantly different at 10 percent.

